scans of blood flow are correlated to anatomical scans of the brain, and so forth (see Figure 1) . The results that come out of these experiments are predominantly presented as visual maps of the brain in action, as pictures of the mind at work, or as snapshots of thoughts.
Since the mid-1980s, brain mapping research has rekindled and reconfigured a materialist approach to the understanding of mental function and dysfunction. It has also rehabilitated the brain-based study of higher mental processes, including the study of consciousness. 1 In the case at hand, like with the "gene of the week" in genetics research, the "localization of the month" provides a concrete unit of scientific knowledge, usually a visual representation of a function in relation to the brain. The import of conceptualizing genetic knowledge as unitary linguistic constructs (DNA as code, the Book of Life) has been much examined as to the impact of this metaphor on the organization of both research and public perceptions of the project (Van Dijck 2000; Kay 2000) . Similarly, the dominance of specific (mainly visual) modes of representation in other fields has recently been analyzed (Galison 1997; Stafford 1991 Stafford , 1996 Treichler, Cartwright, and Penley 1998) , with the suggestion that digital representations might constitute a particular and novel form of visual knowledge. This article explores researchers' understandings of digital representations and the way they are used as devices for the demarcation of a new stream of research.
Given that a wealth of visual representations accompanies this new approach to the study of mental phenomena, what is the role of images in these developments? What does it mean that mental functions become visible? The answer given to both questions by researchers involved in brain mapping would be this: very little. They would generally argue for a highly circumscribed role of images in brain mapping; brain mappers insist that they do not know the brain through images and that these "pretty pictures" are at best useful visual aids when giving talks.
Such an answer is not very surprising to scholars of science and perhaps especially not to those studying technology. The case has been made that this wealth of visual representations is to be expected in the popularization of scientific research.
2 With regard to brain mapping research specifically, there is some evidence that the visual element plays a role in the attractiveness of this research to some media outlet. The science editor of Newsweek explains how a story on brain mapping arose:
In addition to providing beautiful visual material, these images have also taken on what might be called an iconic role, standing for what I have termed "the mind-in-the-brain" (Beaulieu 2000a ). The covers of numerous psychology and neuroscience textbooks are adorned with functional imaging scans of the brain, although their contents might deal only very sparingly with that particular type of research. These biological rainbows, however, are widely used to figure the higher mental functions-broadly defined-evoking concepts ranging from consciousness to humanness.
But besides fulfilling a popularizing and iconic role, these images also abound in research settings as part of the experimental work of researchers. The rise of a wealth of visualizations of the functioning brain has been labeled an important trend by some analysts, a signal that images are increasingly important to scientific knowing and "inundating" in neuroscience, specifically (Stafford 1996) . Others have been critical of these representations, often attacking brain scans' imaging component in relation to the materialist aspects of this research (Goertzel 1995; Paller 1995; Schmitt 1995; Wolf 1997; Fodor 1999 ). Yet, for brain mappers, the visual is a nonstarter. This excerpt is from an interview between anthropologists and pioneers of imaging: Dumit In these excerpts, pacifying work on the part of the interviewer is needed to maintain dialogue between clashing conceptions of what is going on in functional imaging. Why this clash? The argument that pretty pictures are useful for popularization does not explain the way representations 4 also pervade research environments. Yet, researchers insist they do not know the brain by seeing it, by making its activity visible. Denials of the importance of imaging, in a setting where visual representations are abundant, leave the analyst perplexed-and, indeed, at the heart of claims about the contributions of brain mapping is a paradox. Researchers reject the visual yet maintain its use in their work. This article therefore considers a love-hate relationship between scientists and their object-the case of the iconoclastic imager. The paradoxical stance toward representations is analyzed here by examining a number of tropes used to discuss scans and maps in brain mapping, with particular emphasis on discussions of what counts as evidence and the way data are constituted. The analysis presented here therefore considers how images and the visual can seem both central and marginal to the empirics of a group (Knorr-Cetina 1999) .
The visual as problematic should be understood in relation to a tradition that orders types of evidence hierarchically in modern Western science, with images and some forms of visual knowing generally low on the scale (Stafford 1991 (Stafford , 1996 Cartwright 1995) . This hierarchy relies on the ordering of ways of knowing the world, which provide better or worse access to truth about the way things are, appealing merely to the senses (perception), or to the mind (reason). This ordering of image, text, number is not absolute, however, and there are other ways of constituting visual representations according to linguistic or quantitative logics (e.g., as graphs) that enhance their status by associating them with a quantitative ethos rather than a pictorial one.
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Uses of the digital in the context of functional imaging partly reconfigure this hierarchy, when they are regarded as pictures of numbers. This reconfiguration is partial and fragile, however, since digital representations can also be read optically (which might happen when popularizing), thereby lowering their status.
By examining the various ways in which images are deployed and rejected, the origins of these conflicting tendencies in the treatment of representations can be traced to the technological, methodological, and institutional elements in the work of functional imagers. Beyond making sense of this paradox, anthropologically speaking, this approach provides insight into the current demarcation of a new stream of research with regard to other kinds of medical and scientific research-the development of a new epistemic culture (Knorr-Cetina 1999; Loewy 1992 ). This analysis therefore follows the way brain mappers demarcate their object and methods, through their explanations and research practices. To do this, I draw on interviews and fieldwork and present a number of tropes to help understand how researchers make sense of their relationship to scanning data.
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Representations of the active brain have served to establish a particular domain of competence for brain mappers, an emerging group at the boundaries of cognitive and neural science, and to distinguish brain mapping's particular contributions to mind/brain research. 7 In the course of identifying the various logics that order the use of representations, I also reflect on the function for brain mapping of maintaining such an ambiguous stance toward images. Furthermore, since the demarcation of this new stream of research primarily revolves around its use of representations, my analysis also contributes to the discussion about the growing use of authoritative imaging in technoscientific culture. As any and all images become possible, there remains the need for guidelines for "choosing what possibilities are acceptable, above and beyond their technological feasibility" (Stafford 1996) . It is precisely such a case of complex rule making that I examine here.
The Use of Representations, the Abuse of Images
Below is an excerpt from an explanation of the goals of functional imaging, where a strict definition of the epistemological basis of imaging is used by this researcher. This explanation was offered in reaction to questions about the importance of the visual, of imaging in using PET. This researcher was setting me straight about my misplaced interests, revealing in the process the link between world and measurement used by functional imagers.
What we're doing is acquiring data. Every natural object, a tree, a human, a plane is in four dimensions, it has spatial extent, and it has behavior over time. We're trying to measure in those four dimensions. . . . So instead of probing the brain by making one little measurement, say like people used to do with Co 2 coming out of veins, that's just a one dimensional measurement over time. There was no 3-D component to that, so now we're able to measure the brain more appropriately as a three-dimensional object over time. So you could do that for the brain, you could do that for your foot, you could do that for anything. So the fact that we're scanning in 4-D, is that particularly appropriate or inappropriate for the brain? It's just the same as any other physical object.
(Senior Researcher, trained as a physician) The brain is an object in four dimensions; the goal is to assess these dimensions. But in this realist mode, the fact that the measurements are displayed over space is not relevant for the object, in the sense that it is not epistemically constitutive of it. (Note, however, that the previous technique could only probe, make one little measurement.) In this description, a distinction between the object out there and a given mode of measurement is maintained, so that the representation of the data is secondary. This is also a way of maintaining a distance between scientific work and its presentation. A focus on the representation is missing the point:
Now, is that ever the point of any of these studies, is what the pictures look like? Not really. It isn't. It gives you a good impression of the data quality, many people want to show a data slide, so people can get an assessment visually of the signal to noise. It's hard to trust as data a publication in which you haven't seen any of the raw data. 'Cause it just might be noise. So if they show you their raw data in some form, you make an assessment as to whether you should pay attention to this study or not. But beyond that what they're talking about is what the mental operation was that they used, what the paradigm was, what trick they used to isolate this out; they may show you a picture to prove that a function that you thought was unitary is really two. And it's two because it has different cognitive characteristics, different reaction times, or, and it's two spatially, and I'll show you a picture of it and it's here and here. But without attributing the (entire) significance of the representation to what the pictures look like, I will argue that an important role is played by these pictures. It is important in many respects that these measurements are laid out in space because this forms the basis of many of the particularities of functional mapping's contributions over other modes of measurement of the brain. Besides spatiality, another aspect of the empirics of functional brain imaging highlighted in the explanation above is the importance of quantification. Activity in the brain consists of measurements in a number of dimensions (ideally, four), and these results are statistics (ideally, significant). This theme will be explored later, but note that for researchers, if these pictures are pictures of anything, they are pictures of numbers. This is the aspect of their representations they emphasize again and again when discussing their work.
Both quantification and spatiality, the two elements that subtend the empirics of functional imaging, have complex histories that I can only briefly sketch here. I will concentrate on showing how these elements participate in the claims of functional imaging in relation to other disciplines by analyzing a number of tropes that recur in discussions of functional imaging's knowledge claims. These tropes point to the ways in which the quantitative detection of activity, its attribution to an area of the brain, and the construction of a space for relating these two elements are all based on representational strategies that are highly specific to functional imagers. Taken together, tropes relating to quantification and spatiality enable a contextualization of knowledge claims of brain mapping.
The understanding of representations in the functional imaging community is further characterized by a strong division between two possible functions, negative and positive. The latter concerns the use of representations to communicate with colleagues and the public and is addressed briefly at the end of this analysis to provide a necessary contrast with the negative use. The public understanding of these images, itself multiple and complex, is discussed at length elsewhere (Beaulieu 2000b) . The main concern here is the role that is explicitly denied to representations and thereby defined negatively: images do not form the empirical basis of functional imaging. Within this negation, two types of tropes arise, each positioning functional imaging in relation to scientific ideals and demarcating functional imaging from less scientific endeavors. The first redefines scans as representations of quantitation and aims to establish the scientific foundations of the research pursued ("They're not pictures, they're statistical maps"). Related to this theme is the constitution of research as independent from the imaging Beaulieu / Brain Mapping 59 technologies used (not pretty pictures). A second group of tropes distances the work done by researchers from the clinical applications of (PET) imaging ("This is not a radiological science") and the nuclear medicine origin of PET. The abundance of representations in neuroscientific contexts that overwhelms the neophyte 8 clashes with the conceptions of researchers that they are involved in making measurements in the brain, not obtaining images of it. An interesting exception I encountered to this attitude among researchers had to do with a once-off experience, often marking pioneering moments. In such cases, the researchers acknowledged the significance of seeing when the visualization enabled by the technology led to a kind of witnessing. For example, [ The visual] had an initial impact, it was extraordinarily exciting to see things that had never been seen before. I remember several occasions at the Hammersmith, where we saw things that no one had ever seen before. Like the substantia nigra working. So there is an impact, which I guess is the same as the impact of looking through a telescope and seeing something that no one has ever seen before, the impact of the moment when looking at a comet, which is extraordinarily exciting to see. (Senior Researcher, trained as a psychologist)
Rhetorical
The sensory is associated with experience, the moment of discovery or first observation, and not with reasoning. A sense of wonder is associated with seeing, when related to a particular event, but ordinary day-to-day practice of scientific investigation does not fall under such a category. Seeing is not the ordinary technique of investigation; one does not do this work because one is visually oriented.
Researchers insist on the fact that they are not involved in observation but in measurement work. The data of research are described as quantitative: the work is done using "a colored representation of a set of statistical values" (Junior Researcher, trained as physician). Explanations of representations focus on the measurement work involved in making scans, and visual elements of these representations are often discussed as an emergent property of the quantitative data. The data are measurements of phenomena, and they define complex phenomena in a way that imaging, as a pictorial strategy, could not achieve. The phenomenon, the instrument's use, and the understanding of the representation are aligned, integrated in a quantitative mode. This insistence on the quantitative is one of the strategies that prevents the "proliferation of meaning" prized by artists and not by scientists (Bastide 1990) , narrowing the possibility of interpretations that can be made of the results. Although the representation can be altered, made to look better, its referent remains solidly quantitative:
Particularly now with image editing and enhancing, you can manipulate images, and ultimately, one should be able to track everything back down to tables of numbers, which are locations of activations in Talairach space, it's the sort of concept that underneath a glossy exterior, there's a strong skeleton, that refers back to [inaudible] that is what gives some coherence and credibility. (Senior Researcher, trained as a physicist)
Joe Dumit (1994) labeled this reliance monosemy, a quality of the information provided by scans, but more generally it is also one of the main features built into the brain mapper's understanding and production of representations.
The rejection of the visual and the embracing of the quantitative referent involved is often done in the same breath, evoking progress:
But I think that for a field to grow up-and everybody thinks the same, I don't think I'm giving you views that are different from anybody else, in the best places, I don't think I'm putting forward views that are the slightest bit heretical-it becomes important that it become quantitative, science doesn't just deal with pictures, it deals with counting things, graphing things, plotting things. (Senior Researcher, trained as a psychologist)
Brain mappers perform experiments where brain functions are variables, where responses are tested statistically and group data are carefully analyzed. Researchers therefore align their empirical basis, the scans and maps they use, with a quantitative and experimental approach rather than a visual and observational one. In their understanding, a visual label reduces this work to observation. Such observations might be useful for the neurosurgeon, who must plan an intervention-but not for the scientist who seeks to experiment and analyze.
Different groups using functional imaging have slightly different criteria as to what constitutes an experiment, 9 and differences can also be found with neighboring groups of researchers. These differences in the way scans are valued are significant for the scientific status of brain mapping. A frequently recurring expression in discussions of representation is the phrase "pretty pictures." Beaulieu / Brain Mapping 61 Speaking of the visual, the interviewee has just explained how it is significant for communicating with the public: The description of functional imaging work as making pretty pictures invokes again an accusation of lack of scientific purpose through associations with a nonscientific, possibly even popular, visual, and photographic approach. This pejorative description is often heard coming from psychologists who critique the way function is studied. Making pretty pictures of the brain is at best observational and not the scientific study of function through the complex experimental designs prized by psychologists.
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The phrase "pretty picture" has links to the previous trope, since it points to the sensitive issue of (lack of) scientific sophistication. It also relates to the next trope, since it defines brain mapping work as dependent on the technologies used, invoking the passive photographer whose apparatus does the work. The prominence of technology in functional imaging is difficult to overcome: a PET scanner and cyclotron cost up to U.S.$7 to $10 million, and a single PET scan costs about U.S.$1,500. This is especially true given the low-tech context in which much of this work is done. Functional imaging is "little big science," whereas psychology and neurology are not highly technologically dependent fields of research. This overidentification with the technologies they use is countered in general ways by functional imagers by insisting that functional imaging has moved into mainstream neuroscience and sometimes seeming to avoid imaging in describing their work.
11 More specific strategies will be discussed below.
In terms of the status of representations, therefore, functional imagers argue for a quantitative definition of their representations. Representations, when understood as part of an imagistic register, are only accepted as markers of moments of discovery. Otherwise, a discussion in visual terms of the representations used by imagers is considered a lack of understanding of the approach and phenomena these researchers are investigating. Sometimes, such descriptions are precisely aimed at questioning the status of the research (just pretty pictures). But for brain mappers, the proper understanding of functional imaging is to see it as an experimental strategy that measures and explores the brain quantitatively, not one that visualizes it. Interestingly, researchers also connect an explanation for the use of the visual or visualization to the complexity of their quantitative data-their data are actually such complex quantitative measurements (and their relationships) that they can best be rendered visually, since in neuroscientific parlance, vision is the sensory modality with the broadest bandwidth.
If representations are quantitative, the proper way of understanding them must also involve a quantitative rationality. This is the basis of the second trope.
Trope 2: "I have no truck with people who look at images and interpret them."
This trope also negates the visual, but it is directed at a different kind of demarcation of these scientists' work, setting researchers apart from the clinic. The clinicians are image oriented, to the researcher's chagrin. Measurements in quantitative form should be enough to understand the scans, but they are not.
In our clinical work, we provide a list of all brain areas, the metabolic rate for that patient in that area, and the normal range for that area based on our files. And whether that person is plus or minus two standards deviations of the normal range for each area. We also provide the color images because the physicians want it, but we would be happy on our clinical reports just supplying the numerical information [emphasis added]. (quoted in Dumit 1995, p. 105) Clinicians therefore desire a beautiful image of the brain, a desire Dumit (1994) has analyzed as a culturally based longing for insight into what subtends our personhood. But the clinician's desire is the researcher's aberration. It reduces the work to scan making, a technicians' occupation. A quotation above indicates that to link PET and vision is a "radiologic misnomer." This opposition to radiology recurred several times in interviews:
Well, I think that in the field that I'm involved in, which is functional mapping, we have maintained the tradition of quantitation, even if it's relative quantitative or statistical level quantitative, and statistical parametric map (SPM) 12 has been critical to that. So there's no question we would simply inspect images in a radiological sense to make diagnosis or conclusions. That's just not in the ethos at all of what we do and it's never been in my ethos. (Senior Researcher, trained as a physician)
A number of threads can be followed to explain these moves to distanciation from the clinic. First, it is a distinction that relates to the history of the development of these scanners. PET scanners were developed in nuclear medical settings, and while a number of potential uses were suggested, the Beaulieu / Brain Mapping 63 most enthusiastically pursued was that aimed at tumor detection.
13 But even within the early research on cerebral blood flow, there were those working in the tradition of autoradiography and those oriented to nuclear medicine. At this point, it seems that the clinical and research distinctions were already articulated along the lines of image versus number.
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The marked contrast between research and clinical goals in using imaging technologies is also expressed in debates about the very way in which these representations are to be understood. In the 1980s, a debate around the interpretation of PET scans was fought out between the quantitative and qualitative (visual) approach to PET scans at a workshop on PET analysis and subsequently in journals. One side claimed that clinical PET can produce representations that can be understood visually; researchers insisted on a quantitative measurement and a quantitative evaluation. In this debate, PET scans were seen as highly processed data-involving normalizations, statistical tests, and the use of complex models typical of physics research (Carson 1991) . Clinicians argued that certain elements of this process were mainly relevant in the (physics) research context of PET's development and that some complex data corrections might be bypassed without compromising the validity of scans-with the benefit of increasing the clinical usefulness of PET. Furthermore, even when no objections were raised against quantification as being overly complex, the visual appearance was argued to be an even better basis for judgment 15 than quantitative indications (in the form of rates described in tables and lists) (DiChiro and Brooks 1988) . The researcher's analytic approach was not welcomed in the clinic, where it was considered impractical, possibly unnecessary, and often unfeasible. 16 The reverse remains true: visual evaluation does not belong in the scientific ethos of mappers. The debate about quantitation versus visual inspection seems to have subsided in the 1990s, as research-oriented journals developed and meetings were held separately.
Another way of understanding the importance of the distinctions researchers make between visual evaluation and a quantitative approach is to look at a proposal for crossing this boundary. Writing in the Journal of Neuropsychiatry and Clinical Neuroscience, clinical researcher Andreassen and colleagues proposed going from a clinical to research-oriented use of imaging. While "many of these techniques have been developed and marketed as clinical tools to permit physicians to look and render a judgment as to whether a structure or functions is normal or abnormal" (p. 125), the clinical tools can be adapted to serve research purposes. The transformation consists in retrieving the quantitative:
Essentially, the challenge of image analysis is to convert information originally meant for visual gestalt processing into a quantitative and mathematical tool that provides precise estimates of structure size, shape, volume, or physiological activity. (Andreassen et al. 1992) Andreassen's lab offered a number of tools for this purpose. 17 Note that in this process, not only does the understanding changes (from visual gestalt) but also that precision is to be gained and discrete elements to be measured (size, volume, etc.) . Similarly, measuring replaces an understanding of the whole and improves on the scan as gestalt image; multifactored quantitation becomes the goal rather than the judgment of normal or abnormal appearance. (While the focus here is on the main quantitative/visual distinctions, a number of features of imaging could also be shown to contrast between lab and clinic: the use of color, for example.
18 ) To go from a clinical image to research data, one must shift from looking to measuring, from visual understanding to quantifying.
A further reason for this boundary work may be found in the precarious position PET has occupied as a clinical tool. As a very expensive technology, PET's clinical presence has been particularly controversial in the Western economic context of the 1980s (Kevles 1997) . But the costs have not been the only challenge to PET's clinical acceptance. Technically, the need for an onsite cyclotron makes the use of PET a big enterprise even for academic/ research oriented hospitals (Frick et al. 1992) . The regulation of tracer production has also been perceived as threatening the wider distribution of PET scanners.
19 At regular intervals for the past three decades, PET has been said to be on the cusp of becoming clinical or of losing what little foothold it had acquired 20 and has seen its clinical efficacy problematized or downright challenged (Powers et al. 1991; Volkow and Tancredi 1986) . Maintaining associations with clinical PET, which is challenged in terms of safety, clinical usefulness, and economic liability, is therefore not appealing to research groups. These discussions of the role that representations do not play are therefore indicative of the ideals that functional imaging is pursuing. Furthermore, they also show how these ideals in brain mapping's empirics are related to disciplinary and technological contexts.
Those "who look at images and interpret them" are therefore clinicians using PET.
21 They are those who have different (or less) technological support, a different expertise and goals that clearly differ, although they use some of the same technology. The arguments about the visual/quantitative understanding of these representations express the depth of these differences.
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Claims to scientific status and degrees of greater scientific legitimacy can Beaulieu / Brain Mapping 65 therefore be understood by the rejection of definitions of representations that focus too closely on "the visual," which is not scientific because not quantitative, which belongs in the clinic because of the understanding involved (judgment), 23 and which too closely ties the work to imaging technologies and observation.
Demonstrating Space and Showing Location and the Persistence of the Pictorial
The next tropes to be discussed all share an evocation of space. In putting forth the particular contributions of brain mapping research, the possibility of opening up new spaces for explorations (quite literally) and the insights to be derived from relating different kinds of information to the space of the brain are key elements, which are also entwined with the use of representations.
Trope 3: "For the first time in the history of neuroscience, it is now possible to 'observe' cognitive activity in the intact human brain" (Cabeza and Nyberg 1997, p . 1).
Functional imagers stress the power of brain imaging technologies to encompass the entire brain of normal subjects. The space enclosed by the skull has been penetrated:
These technologies have breached the biological limitations imposed by the inaccessibility of the functioning brain to direct observation and investigations, since they allow direct assessment of brain function in the normal living human being. (Tancredi and Volkow 1992, p. 549) The elements of directness, in vivo study, and normality that the technologies allow are considered truly unique to functional imaging. Furthermore, brain function has become more directly accessible. This is a common formulation of the powers of imaging. Being able to view the normal human has meant studying different kinds of subjects:
While computed technology (CT) was a means of viewing the internal anatomy of the human body, PET extended that view to organ function. Brainbehavior relationships in human, long the provence [sic] of neuropsychologists and cognitive psychologists studying patients with brain lesions, could not be pursued with rather remarkable accuracy in normal subjects as well. (Raichle 1996, p. R3) Rather than relying on accidents of nature (strokes, tumors) that would affect function and thereby give some (indirect) information about the localization of functions, researchers can study activations in normally functioning brains-function, rather than disrupted function. It also means a different approach than intraoperative stimulations, which are done on patients with brain pathologies justifying such interventions. Furthermore, because the imaging technologies can retrieve the signal of the brain noninvasively, the space is undisturbed, considered normal. Again, this contrasts with the intraoperative stimulations, which are done on patients whose brains are affected by surgical procedures. This possibility also contrasts in obvious ways with another direct mode of study, which consists in studying patients with lesions in life and correlating their disfunctions with postmortem studies of brain anatomy.
Being able to see inside the brain space in vivo relies on features built into the technologies used in brain mapping. Both origin stories and technical descriptions of PET insist on the importance of the creation of the means for reconstructing images from the measurements made by the detectors.
24 For example, x-ray CT immediately stimulated scientists and engineers to consider alternative ways of creating images of the body's interior using similar mathematical and computer strategies for image reconstruction. This quickly led to the introduction of positron emission tomography (PET) which was, in effect, a means of doing tissue autoradiography in vivo in humans. (Raichle 1996) The manipulation of data in different space retrieving the space of the brain inside the scanner is considered foundational to modern or mature PET technology. 25 To be able to measure in 4-D, therefore, the relation between the space of the brain inside the scanner and the space of the digital image had to be constructed. Representations in PET imaging are the product of the recovery of the origin in space of the signal, and this is built into the scanning technology. Tomography, the technological possibility of making these kinds of images, is also the key to placing brain activity in space.
A further line of argument also corroborates the significance of the spatial dimension for functional imaging: new technologies, such as magnetoencephalography (MEG), and older ones, such as electroencephalogram (ERP/ EEG), have been enrolled as part of the armamentarium of brain mapping in the early 1990s on the basis of the spatial information they could convey.
26
As these technologies provide spatial data, they come to be considered as part of the brain-mapping box of tools. This association tells of the centrality of Beaulieu / Brain Mapping 67 spatial information of functional imaging technology. Tools are appropriate if they can provide data about the brain in such a way that they can be represented in space-precisely as measurements laid out over space.
If by the mid-1970s PET provided tomographic data, having data represented in a physiologic space was not meaningful. The need to create a special space in which to understand PET was an important item on the agenda of the growing PET community in the early 1980s. The spatiality of PET measurements has long been a core concern; PET was said to present "a challenge to an old discipline," namely, neuroanatomy (Mazziotta 1984) . It provided metabolic measurements in the tomographic space of the scanner, which had to be both distinguished from and reconciled to the anatomical space of the brain. This could be described as the attempt to reconcile the pictorial renditions of anatomy with quantitative measures of metabolic activity in a digital space. The physiological data provided by PET was eventually constructed so that it could be layered onto an anatomical space (see Figure 2) .
The relation to anatomical space was therefore an important element in establishing the credibility of PET with neurologists and neurosurgeons who were early users of PET. But the anatomical space is particular, suited to the needs of imagers, working in a digital context and striving to be quantitative. The anatomy of imagers differs from that of other neuroscientists: locations in functional imaging are defined quantitatively, in a Cartesian space, and not by a linguistically ordered nomenclature. In constructing a measurement space, the quantitative ethos of the functional imagers orders the visual and linguistic conventions of anatomists and clinicians. 27 These developments in functional imaging have resulted in technologies that produce traces in explicit spaces and modes of analysis that rely on well-defined spatial components and anatomical referents. These are not post hoc contextualizations of functional imaging data but are integral to obtaining it. These elements of functional imaging are also relevant to understanding the other claims made by functional imagers. Representations in 4-D are the product of PET methodology and technology, not an afterthought. In introducing anatomy to the understanding of PET, brain and mind, function and anatomy, could be mapped by being correlated in a common space. New evidence using functional imaging techniques provides a "concrete status" to theories of brain functions. Since these studies are done in normal humans, researchers state, the full range of the mind's functions can be studied and also made concrete. Having access to the normal human brain is a significant element. For example, it is argued that many of the higher cognitive functions are in the frontal lobes, so that animal studies are of limited use since "the biggest discrepancies between man and animal are found in the frontal lobes" (Frith et al. 1991) . In functional imaging, the normal human brain can therefore be used as a basis for those studying the mind. NOTE: This is a Cartesian space, where every point is labeled with an x, y, z coordinate, enabling the matching of different types of data according to location. This figure is a screenshot of software used by brain mappers. The window on the right represents merged functional (PET) and anatomical data (magnetic resonance imaging). On the left are slide bars (corresponding to the x, y, and z axes), which allow the user to move through different slices and navigate the space of the brain.
The goal of cognitive neuroscience is to identify the neural substrates of cognitive processes. Our chances of achieving this goal have radically increased during the last decade by the introduction of functional neuroimaging techniques. . . . For the first time in the history of neuroscience, it is now possible to "observe" cognitive activity in the intact human brain. (Cabeza and Nyberg 1997, p. 1) Brain imaging provides such a tool for deepening one's understanding of the mind by inscribing it into the space of the brain.
Those cognitive scientists interested in a deeper understanding of how the human mind works now believe that it is maximally fruitful to propose models of cognitive processes that can be assessed in neurobiological terms. (Gazzaniga 1989, p. 2) Imaging technologies are considered to provide the best methods to make the move described above-using the brain to test the mind. Indeed, functional imagers often point out that psychologists do not deal with the brain but with a construct they call the mind. What the functional imaging methods have to offer is a grounding in the brain of these constructs:
It all depends if they care about where things are located in the brain. If they're cognitive psychologists, then they don't understand that all objects are in four dimensions, not just one. Cognitive psychologists tend to think of the mind as being only in time. But the mind has a physical counterpart, the brain. And if you want to adequately study the mind, you need to study the brain as well. And that moves you into four dimensions, and that means you actually represent where the properties are in those three dimensions and that you need to study them, in space, over time, and that is a shortcoming of theirs. (Senior Researcher, trained as a physician) The brain as a space in which to ground the study of mind is overlooked by psychologists-focused as they are on process, in terms of time, and not on the implementation of these processes in a material realm. Brain mappers credit themselves with a better object of study; they represent properties where they lie.
The way in which the mind is made concrete through being studied with functional imaging again focuses on the use of spatiality. The experimental methods of brain mapping rely on spatial differences (see Figure 3) . Specifically, the experimental paradigm in brain mapping distinguishes functions through their correspondence to measurements of activity laid out in space rather than to the time needed to accomplish them. The contrast between the tasks represents a particular operation, and this operation is then considered to be implemented in the area (or areas) that differ. The subtraction method based on the work of Donders and Sternberg (Draaisma 1989 ) has thus been adapted in this field through a shift from measurement in time to measurement in space. This shift is a determinant in translating much of the phenomena of cognitive psychology into phenomena that can be studied with functional imaging. This experimental approach has been rather inelegantly formulated as the "where" question. Thus, where has been described as the question about the human brain best answered by brain mapping's converging disciplines (Wood 1994) . But where has not always been the key question for cognitive psychology (Raichle 1998) . The particular contribution that functional imaging provides is to penetrate the brain space and allow the study of the mind in that space rather than treating it as a series of events in time. Accusations of a lack of sophistication in manipulating the function being studied have been made by some cognitive psychologists (as noted in the discussion of pretty pictures above). But the imagers counter that the cognitive scientists' measurements are less direct:
by observing the input and output responses . . . they are not able to demonstrate the mechanisms by which the organ works. This is formalistic, whatever boxes they put it, these boxes are not ontologically committed, so that's a major drawback. (Senior Researcher, trained as a neuroscientist)
Because based on external measurements (reaction time or accuracy of responses), cognitive psychologists can only provide an indirect measureindirect, in the sense that it will not measure activity in the space of the brain. Brain mapping presumably deals with ontologically committed versions of functions-this commitment is based on exploiting, on one hand, the quantitative for scientific legitimacy and the spatiality of the brain for a concrete material basis for the study of mental functions. Functional brain imaging therefore relies on the constitution of spaces for measurements and measurements of activations in relation to those spaces. Showing that mental processes are somewhere in the brain involves technologies and methodologies of space reconstruction of PET and on the subtraction method. By making and showing their measurements in the brain based on spatial differentials, the anatomical space of the brain must be rendered, reintroducing the pictorial tradition in the representations of functional imagers. While the point may not be about how the picture looks, as one interview argued, the point is very much about seeing the activity being laid out in three dimensions, which is a feat accomplished by invoking conventions for representing space.
Through their privileged access to the study of function and its biological implementation, imagers therefore carve out a particular territory in the study of functions in the brains of normal, living subjects. Furthermore, functional Beaulieu / Brain Mapping 71 imagers distinguish their work from animal experiments because they work on humans and can therefore encompass the highest, typically human functions-the mind. Brain mappers also distinguish their approach in terms of space from other types of investigation of the human brain. Another distinctive claim of functional imaging is the possibility of imaging the entire brain. This has implication for demarcating imaging work from both neuroscientific approaches and neuropsychological studies, which have been concerned with localization or mapping work (in the general sense of attributing functions to locations). The apprehension of the brain in its entirety provides a different territory for investigation than the space of the brain that is available to other methods, such as intraoperative stimulation, where only a very small part of the brain is visible and manipulable. Other methods make one small measurement by probing the brain, whereas functional imaging can encompass the whole volume of the head.
Since localization research is the coupling of functional and location, a different version of a territory leads to different definitions of functions. The possibility of measuring all processes in the entire brain subtends the claims of functional imaging that it can investigate the brain at a systems level. This argument is often used to show the break between the localizationists and functional imaging. Since they do not equate one region with one function, systems-level investigations mark this type of mapping as a new endeavor. Thus, in contrast to traditional methods of neuropsychology or intraoperative stimulation, functional imaging does not show only the essential areas for a function but an entire system that subtends a function. Measuring activity in the brain at a systems level has been an important result of collaborations of psychologists and neuroscientists.
First, as you know, the results are bound by the methods. So if you work with single unit recordings, you tend to be shortsighted, you will understand some details of local computations, but you have no idea whatsoever, how the organ is functioning at the systems level. Nobody had any ideas about the function at the systems level . . . and one of the major landmarks is this immense, we can call it parallel processing, but we call it multiple neuronal populations or multiple synaptic populations collaborate to produce functions of the brain. . . . [Neuropsychologists] tend to interpret their results in the traditional localizationistic way. They had no idea how disperse, I wouldn't say diffuse, but dispersed it really is . . . the brain really does work this way with these huge populations. So I think that's very fortunate. That is why the methods are so efficient. (Senior Researcher, trained as a neuroscientist) According to this pioneer of functional imaging, without being able to measure these entire systems spread all over the brain, the way the brain works could not be understood. Being able to consider functions as systems (and not as unitary, with particular places in the brain, which once removed will affect only that one function leaving the rest of the brain undisturbed) is a major methodological leap, a change of mindset. Such claims to measuring the simultaneity of activations of parts of the brain, of measuring at the systems levels, further relies on detecting groups of areas connected in space and the layering of functional and anatomical information.
Conclusion

Images of Mind and Graphs of Numbers in Space
I have examined a number of redefinitions in relation to functional imaging: what constitutes a modern PET scanner, what makes a technology a functional imaging technology, what constitutes a proper basis for analyzing PET data, and how the highest human functions can be investigated experimentally. The answers to these questions have to do with the possibility of providing spatial measurements. Linked to these modes of measurements are the particular knowledge claims that have arisen from functional imaging: seeing the brain at a systems level and making mind phenomena visible in the human brain. These claims, which set functional imaging apart from other approaches and other groups of investigators, are linked to the representations of functional data in a dimensional space: pictorial conventions are mobilized to relate functional data to the substance of the brain. Thus, in spite of the distancing from imaging contexts and from the visual discussed in the first part, the arguments and claims of functional imagers rely to a great extent on aspects of these traditions. It appears that while an epistemic role is often denied to representations, their use does contribute to the study of the brain specific to functional imaging through reliance on the spatiality of data. The ambiguous relationships of imagers to their representations therefore stem from the fact that much of the empirics that subtend their contributions to the study of the brain is achieved by using pictorial conventions to render space-the very tradition from which functional imagers try to distance themselves by insisting on quantifications.
Having identified the two major components that subtend the empirics of brain mappers, the attitude of researchers to the use of images becomes clearer. These researchers are not entirely iconoclastic in that they do accept that images play a role, but they do fear too great a reliance on the icon-a seduction of the senses and the neglect of the greater truth that lies beyond representations. The quantitative and the spatial are not always easily reconciled in the representational strategies of brain mapping. When tensions arise, and researchers seem concerned by the overemphasis on representations, it is because of the ambiguous relationship of these two elements, which traditionally characterize different ways of knowing. When balance is maintained, a positive role is readily granted to representations. Insofar as they function as tools for communication and not as an empirical basis or style of evaluation, representations are praised for their directness and synthetic power, which imagers see as legitimately deployable in Let's take an SPM. To the uninitiated, they will see a picture as an activity in the brain and at some level they will see that as the activity and they will forget that it has to be taken into account that that is not the activity, that is a colored representation of a set of statistical values. And those values have been smoothed spatially, and in time, in the case of fMRI. They've been warped. They've been realigned. They've been through all kinds of crunch, and in setting out to simplify, the picture can to some extent deceive. (Junior Researcher, trained as a physician)
To see a picture as transparent, as the activity in the brain, is not an appropriate way of seeing; measurements must be understood in terms of their quantitative production, not simply in terms of the phenomena they represent. 29 Yet, in other settings, it is precisely the seduction of the viewer through an optical, intuitive understanding of representations that enables functional imagers to communicate effectively. Researchers acknowledge the efficiency of representations in drawing the attention of the public to their work, although the lay public will understand them differently. This marks yet another important demarcation, drawing a boundary between what is scientific and what falls outside science and into the popular realm.
What I wish to highlight here are the demarcations that researchers themselves make in relation to representations and, more specifically, how these relate to the difficulty of reconciling image and number, as brain mapping constitutes its object as quantitative measurements in space. The image speaks for itself, but not in quite the same way to everyone-the pictorial aspects of these representations predominate in the public's understanding. One of the consequences of this dual register around representations is that it allows neuroscientists to have it both ways: to make claims with scientific integrity while providing visually exciting materials for the public to understand intuitively-and because of this understanding, gather further support for research.
But the possibility of working both crowds has certain limits; the intuitive is not scientific and therefore dangerous. Other scientists also monitor the boundary between lay and scientific discourses, and functional imagers are aware of the possibility of a backlash.
Uncritically, everybody gets excited about imaging. It's a double-edged sword, because it's nice to get into the media but also sometimes tends to be denigrated Beaulieu / Brain Mapping 75 by other scientists in other scientific domains as glitz and showboating rather than serious science. As far as I'm concerned, we are doing serious quantitative systems neuroscience. We are very conscious that we are doing three-and fourdimensional data analysis. The fact that the data is actually representable in an appealing visual form is extra. (Senior Researcher, trained as a physicist) The restraint of scientists is therefore both the need to be silent about the difficulties and contingencies of digital imaging (Lynch 1991) and the need for researchers to observe a certain restraint in presenting their work in nonscientific terms. This is not platonic rhetoric of technoskeptics to denounce visual corruption, to use Stafford's (1996) phrase, but rather gatekeeping between the rationality of the scientific world and the intuitive reasoning of the public. When representations that scientists believe invoke intuitive, nonscientific modes of understanding are used, the threat is all the more powerful. 30 The epistemics of functional imagers cannot include the purely pictorial or imagistic without renouncing claims to be pursuing quantitative, scientific experiments.
Mixed Traditions, Hybrid Objects
The research pursued with functional imaging technologies and methods is construed by its practitioners as the crossroads between cognitive psychology and neuroscience:
It has come to the point, as it often happens in science, that a discipline arises between two existing disciplines. I don't think that will go away. The discipline is not PET and fMRI. It's all the methods for imaging, evoked potential, MEG, united around the fact that we can do things with the human brain that we never could do. . . . It's not cognitive psychology, it's not neuroscience, it's somewhere in the middle. (Senior Researcher, trained as a neuroscientist)
The formation of an interdisciplinary approach brings together a number of scientific traditions and their particular standards of what constitutes scientific evidence (their empirics). It also contributes to the paradox of the iconoclastic imager, whose hybrid object of the mind-in-the-brain is constituted by drawing on distinct representational strategies.
After about ten years of functional imaging research, there have recently been calls to review the research agenda. Interestingly, many of the criticisms of the current state of research and proposals for future developments also point to place given to representational practice in functional imaging. The results provided by functional imaging have been labeled as limited because it is geographic (Mountcastle 1998)-a criticism that rebukes the emphasis 76 Science, Technology, & Human Values on the spatial in functional imaging research. In the same vein, others argue that while the neophrenology of the past years has been necessary and continues to provide unique insight (into the entire, normal human living brain), researchers need to consider it as an empirical basis and not as an end in itself (Frackowiak 1998) . Knowing the answer to "where" should be used to answer questions about how the brain works. These representations should be used as the starting point for further analysis, as observations on the basis of which researchers can theorize, and as the materials from which principles of brain organization will be discovered. Maps will lead to principles and to models of brain function. 31 As one researcher predicted, "So once the field grows up [and] becomes less interested in mapping, it will be numbers" (Senior Researcher, trained as a psychologist). Such statements makes sense in terms of a hierarchy of types of scientific evidence, here shown to be embraced and reproduced by the researchers using imaging. According to this particular understanding, functional imaging aspires to scientific status; an empirical basis is being built, and as a field matures, the representations used will be purified and tend toward the quantitative. This may be yet another instance of the rejection of the visual to discover (by nonvisual means) what is "hidden beyond the phenomenal tide" (Stafford 1991) . If the current research agenda is transformed to address other questions about the mind-in-the-brain, the style of empirics will also change and the importance of representations will be altered.
Others enthusiastically predict that future development is possible for brain mappers, although the acceptance of brain mapping data, either from an individual modality or provided in composite, will be enhanced by display approaches that provide data presentations and images that are immediately recognizable to individuals with a knowledge of cerebral anatomy. (Mazziotta and Toga 1996, pp. 454-55) Data will have to be translated into a form that allows a visual understanding, the immediate, clinical, image-based use. If the results of research are to be applied, representations will have to be adapted to a different understandingthe measurements of scientists will have to be brought more closely in line with the anatomical, pictorial tradition of the clinic. These two scenarios further highlight the tensions in brain mapping's empirics, involving complex representations.
At the heart of the paradoxical understanding of representations in this field is the dual appeal to the graphical and pictorial. Functional imaging makes use of the pictorial tradition of anatomical representations to provide spatial referents to the data it produces (activity in the brain) and convey the Beaulieu / Brain Mapping 77 notion of control of the space of measurement (seeing the entire brain). Yet it also distantiates itself from the traditional visual understanding that accompanies these anatomical representations and invokes a graphical tradition where the correspondence of representation image to world is one of quantity and measurement, not one of depiction.
Making images of the mind in a bounded brain provides an important basis for biological explanations of behavior. Functional imaging research has been directed at finding the physical substrates of mind, the underlying causes of deviant behavior and disease. In some ways, this project is comparable to the phrenological and localizationist projects of the nineteenth century, where faculties were linked to bumps and pathological functions to brain regions. But brain mapping is constructed as measuring activity in the complex space of the living, acting brain, rejecting both the shallow study of the surface of phrenology and the anatomo-clinical stance of the localizationists' postmortem correlation. Furthermore, understanding the empirics of brain mapping not only makes sense of the rejection of the clinical visual diagnosis discussed in the first part but also explains the particular version of anatomy developed by brain mappers (the many permutations of the x, y, z Talairach brain space). Functional imagers do not value skills of visual recognition; instead, they invest the space of the brain with a graphical efficacy that allows quantitation and calculation.
This analysis also sheds light on the ambiguous relationship of researchers to the representations they use and proposes that this relationship is shaped by criteria of scientific credibility, on one hand and, on the other, of the ways in which brain mapping carves out a terrain of expertise in relation to other disciplines based on tools and techniques available. These two elements can be shown to sustain both an iconoclastic stance toward these representation while also providing motivations for the sustained use of representations.
The paradox of images in functional imaging is therefore the result of the attempt to segregate various aspects of representations. While efficiently evoking control and knowledge of space and simultaneity of measurement, representations must be used with care and cannot simply be presented as visual proofs without endangering claims to scientific status. Even in nonscientific contexts, the visual argument must be used circumspectly. Hence, researchers separate the visual appearance from the content, seeing from reasoning, and imaging from experimenting yet rely on the synthetic power of representations to make their object and to inscribe new phenomena in the space of the brain.
By observing the hopes and anxieties around representations, this analysis reveals important dynamics in the development of a scientific, research-oriented project. What constitutes relevant empirical strategies are deeply rooted in material, disciplinary, and institutional contexts from which this new project arises. Numerous case studies have shown that while all sciences deal with signs to some extent, they do so differently, within logics that can be characterized as "epistemic cultures" (Knorr-Cetina 1999) or traditions of evidence (Galison 1997) and that can be observed. This case shows that cultures can also clash and that seemingly contradictory statements are in fact sensible in highly specific hybrid contexts-the repercussions of empirical dissonance (image/number). Galison (1997) has suggested that new forms of imaging using computerized counters that turn numbers into images has marked the integration of traditions of evidence in physics, that:
the tension between analog technical knowledge and digital technical knowledge is a deep one and that this division has cut across disciplinary boundaries. The weaving together of the two traditions in the last few decades represents a previously hidden unifying trend in an age of scientific specialization. Homologous and homomorphic representations have coalesced. (p. 41) The case of functional brain imaging shows rather that while kinds of knowledge have been integrated and reshaped to some extent, differences do endure (at least for a time) as tensions visible in future scenarios. This may be because Galison's case of mixed traditions is situated within a fairly rigid lab situation. Functional imaging has had a much less structured environment so that different traditions of evidence live on in the clinic and in the various research settings where brain mapping is done, challenging and destabilizing these attempts at syncretism. The case of brain scanner imaging, which can support both analogue and digital discourses, stresses the way different registers may be used to both make claims and to claim scientific status for one's work. Finally, this case highlights the importance of context-sensitive analyses of representations to understand the persistence of analogue and digital registers. While the use of visual tools in science seems to be increasing, no single dynamic captures all new developments in the production and manipulation of visual data.
Notes
1. See Changeux and Ricoeur (1998) and Russo (1999) for discussions of recent work. 2. Galison (1997) , among others, showed how the image is privileged in popularization of physics research. He noted that images are rhetorically powerful (in a Latourian sense) to carry the existence of new phenomena into new realms. I have discussed elsewhere how this is also the case for brain imaging, through reliance on an understanding of the visual representations based on photographic realism (Beaulieu 2000b ).
Beaulieu / Brain Mapping 79 3. Examples of this use of brain scans are numerous and easy to find in the science section of any bookstore. Consider, for example, the cover of the volume edited by Stephen Rose (1999) , From Brains to Consciousness, which juxtaposes gray anatomical scans (brains) and rainbowcolored functional scans (consciousness).
4. To make this argument, I will be considering changing and contrasting definitions of what I, as a student of the visual, would call images in brain mapping. I will use the term representation to describe this changing object, which has different meanings in the neuroscientific sphere, in the popular domain and in my own discussion. This decision allows me to discuss the ways in which meanings are contested, negotiated, or simply taken for granted. It also highlights the unacknowledged work performed with representations-the work involved in inscribing them in particular traditions, of making them pictures or graphs. Finally, this neutral term may also be a useful boundary object with which to enter into a dialogue with the various groups that produce these representations without evoking the negative reactions illustrated in the interview excerpts.
5. See Lynch (1991) for a contrast of optical versus digital modes of scientific work. 6. The fieldwork material used here arises from periods of study in two leading laboratories involved in functional imaging in Europe and North America (1997) and from observations and interviews at various international events in the brain mapping community (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) . The excerpts presented here are representative of attitudes and arguments encountered in fieldwork. Researchers quoted all mainly use brain mapping as their method of investigation. They are identified here according to their field of training and career point, since brain mapping has an interdisciplinary character and very few of its members actually received degrees or were primarily trained in it.
7. Groups of researchers need to maintain an identity to have their particular contributions recognized and to claim scientific or professional authority. Such an identity can be built through demarcation work by using rhetorical strategies (Derksen 1997) . Demarcations must yield more than simply the possibility of having an enclosed circle in which to develop scientific theoriesit must also create a demand for a particular kind of knowledge or expertise (Derksen 1999 ). In the case at hand, the format of the knowledge claims of researchers will be shown to be reconfigured in particular contexts to better create such a demand.
8. I recall jotting down in my notes that I was seeing more images at my first brain conference than at any film or art history lecture I had ever attended. This contrast between the empirical basis and the mode of expression can also be explained by the association of hierarchies of ways of knowing-art historians seek to heighten their insight into art through linguistic expression of their visual understanding, while brain imagers, having a stronger empirical basis, relatively speaking, can afford to make their expression visual. I am also a participant in this-the first version of this text contained no illustrations. Gould (1998) noted the distinction in the visual component in the rhetorical style of scientists and humanists.
9. Even within research activities using PET, there is a hierarchy from more to less quantitative, depending on the way measurements are made: "There are conflicts between those who use it qualitatively and superficially and those who use it analytically, by their nature" (Phelps 1991 , quoted in Dumit 1995 . This researcher then goes on to contrast various types of research, and the likely reaction of neurochemists (from the highly quantitative end) to clinical research: 10. This complex experimental design especially focuses on manipulating tasks so that functions/processing stages/operations can be distinguished. Cognitive psychologists focus on very specific components of tasks, for example, distinguishing visually presented animals from visually presented tools. Functional imaging has investigated functions at a less specific level, with early experiments distinguishing cognitive from visual activations, for example. More recent work has produced more sophisticated activation paradigms, but the degree of specificity in tasks performed is still not as great as in cognitive psychology. Cognitive psychologists also focus on measures of time and error/accuracy of responses. This contrast of measurements in time and space will be further discussed below.
11. Arguments about the need to distance the research endeavor from the technological means also arose in discussions to set up the Organization for Human Brain Mapping. The foundation of a professional organization based on the common use of technologies was resisted as unnecessary or even a dead end because of the perceived hazards attached to overidentification with technologies if brain mapping was to thrive in mainstream neuroscience.
12. Statistical parametric map is a format commonly used to order functional activation data. 13. In relation to PET, some of the early goals in nuclear medicine were to develop a tool that would compete with x-ray CT, for example, by allowing imaging of structure of organs that could not be detected by x-ray (Wagner 1992) . A pioneer of mapping studies recounts the efforts as trying to regain ground lost to CT: "Nuclear medicine brain scans, which had been a staple of the practice of nuclear medicine, were quickly replaced by x-ray CT" (Raichle 1996a, p. 189) . There was also a tension between the clinically oriented imagers and those who wanted to do autoradiography in humans with it. Raichle argued the right course was to hold off from clinical applications, because it did not provide anatomical data that was already understood clinically but, rather, measurements that were not. The link between measurement of brain blood flow and brain activity was not a significant part of the PET agenda until about 1984 and became a measurement of cognitive processes a few years later. Mature PET (in a technological sense) had already been developed for ten years at that point.
14. Louis Sokoloff, husband of nurse and aircraft pilot Betty Kaiser, worked with Kety and Schmidt at the University of Pennsylvania and later at the National Institute of Mental Health. A pioneer of the methods on which PET is based, he was said to be uninterested in detection by imaging. He reaffirmed the alignment of science and measurement, citing an aphorism by Lord Kelvin that hangs on his office wall: "When you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meager and unsatisfactory kind" (Kennedy 1991, p. 188) .
15. A stream of science and technology studies research analyzes the professionalization of vision (seeing as a learned activity and not as a self-evident, biologically determined sensory activity) and the codification of the understanding of visual evidence. These analyses emphasize the construction of the directness of the image as embedded in learned skills of vision and claims to professional expertise in apprehending this directness. Vision is shown to be the result of various social, interactive processes and not a given perceptual attribute. This last body of scholarship includes both analyses of the historical moments in the formation of vision (Crary 1990; Cartwright 1995; Treichleretalo 1998; Pasveer 1992; Kember 1991; Yoxen 1987) as well as the individual socialization of seeing as a professional practice (Goodwin 1994 (Goodwin , 1995 .
16. The clinical gaze is not itself simple and unproblematic (see note 15). There are rules for visual understanding, which are also embedded in technologies and traditions of evidence. Many analyses of this skill follow this (Foucauldian) line: Visually based scientific surveillance requires that the expert's gaze be "clarified in order that the disease should give up its hidden secrets into the domain of the visual" (Marshall 1990, in Terry and Urla 1995) .
17. Andreassen et al. (1992) noted that observer intervention is sometimes necessary in using some of these tools, but she also redefined seeing in mechanistic terms. The observer is also Beaulieu / Brain Mapping 81 12 to 20 sensors to arrays of 120 to 150). This resulted in a better link of the activations to specific sites; the source of the signal is less uncertain than before, when different types of activations could have been responsible for the same detected pattern (e.g., Mountcastle 1998) . The notion of space is a determinant feature to make these technologies part of the functional imaging armamentarium.
27. This issue of standardized representational conventions has been so central to the work of functional imagers that sharing references to Talairach, the publication at the basis of the imagers' system for creating a space, has been used as a marker to measure the growing production of functional imaging work. See Fox (1997) .
28. Not surprisingly, if psychologists and cognitive scientists question the notion of "function" that is used in these studies, neuroscientists'criticism comes from the brain end. They challenge the meaning of the signals detected by PET. Here, too, hierarchies of evidence are at play. Recent pronouncements on the foundational principles of neuroscience (see Mountcastle 1998) state that the ultimate cause of mental activity is the neuron-so that researchers dealing with measurements of neuronal activity are sometimes critical of imaging because blood flow is coupled, but only loosely so, to the activity of neurons. One researcher who had moved from research using EEG to imaging described going from evidence to suggestion, from physiology to metabolism. The link between neuronal activity and blood flow has at times been a controversial topic in the imaging community.
29. This responsibility to see properly echoes what I evoked earlier as one of the enduring aspects of modern concepts of scientific ideals: reason's duty to monitor the senses. This notion surfaces in moral terms, where, in the face of the development of more and more imaging technologies, scientists must bear the responsibility of proper scientific knowing and not be deceived by the transparency of images (Crease 1993 ). An image, the argument goes, can fool one into thinking one understands an object in a way a graph or measurement would not. This aligns rationality, proper understanding, and moral responsibility as one mode of dealing with images and intuitive understanding, uncertain knowledge, and seduction as another.
30. This may add a further layer to Lynch's (1991) program of understanding opticism in terms of "a set of instructions for performing actions in accord with the various optical knowledge-production machines; a disciplinary compliance on the part of the subjects in those systems" (p. 58). This dynamic of backlash reinforces the scenarios of compliance with rationality (i.e., not visual) and the maintenance of the boundary between the scientific and the popular.
31. See, for example, Friston (1998) .
